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Abstract 
This article will discuss the impact of China's debt diplomacy in Sri Lanka through the Belt 
Road Initiative (BRI) which has an impact on China's control of the Hambantota Port for 99 
years. The Belt and Road Initiative with the promotion of infrastructure investment is an 
example of the use of Chinese soft power diplomacy on a global level. In the Hambantota Port 
development project, Sri Lanka relied on development funding from China and subsequently 
defaulted. At first the Sri Lankan Government under the leadership of Mahinda Rajapaksa 
opened the investment door for China. From 2010 to 2015, China provided a $ 4.8 billion loan 
to build various infrastructure projects including the Hambantota Port, new airports, power 
plants and highways. Sri Lanka was then caught up in debt diplomacy carried out by China. 
Then, this article also discusses the response and efforts of the Sri Lankan government to 
renegotiate the ownership of Chinese shares in the Hambantota Port project. The Sri Lankan 
government is working hard to get out of the debt diplomacy trap. This article also then 
discusses the strategic economic and political impacts of controlling the Hambantota Port by 
China. This article uses books, research reports, theses, journals, newspapers, and online news 
as reference material. 
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Abstrak 
Artikel ini akan membahas dampak diplomasi utang Tiongkok di Sri Lanka melalui Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI) yang berdampak pada kendali Tiongkok terhadap Pelabuhan Hambantota 
selama 99 tahun. Inisiatif Sabuk dan Jalan dengan promosi investasi infrastruktur adalah contoh 
penggunaan diplomasi soft power Tiongkok di tingkat global. Dalam proyek pengembangan 
Pelabuhan Hambantota, Sri Lanka mengandalkan dana pembangunan dari Tiongkok dan 
kemudian gagal. Pada awalnya Pemerintah Sri Lanka di bawah kepemimpinan Mahinda 
Rajapaksa membuka pintu investasi untuk Tiongkok. Dari 2010 hingga 2015, Cina 
memberikan pinjaman $ 4,8 miliar untuk membangun berbagai proyek infrastruktur termasuk 
Pelabuhan Hambantota, bandara baru, pembangkit listrik, dan jalan raya. Sri Lanka kemudian 
terjebak dalam diplomasi hutang yang dilakukan oleh Tiongkok. Kemudian, artikel ini juga 
membahas tanggapan dan upaya pemerintah Sri Lanka untuk menegosiasikan kembali 
kepemilikan saham Tiongkok dalam proyek Pelabuhan Hambantota. Pemerintah Sri Lanka 
bekerja keras untuk keluar dari perangkap diplomasi utang. Artikel ini juga membahas dampak 
ekonomi dan politik strategis dari pengendalian Pelabuhan Hambantota oleh Tiongkok. Artikel 
ini menggunakan buku, laporan penelitian, tesis, jurnal, surat kabar, dan berita online sebagai 
bahan referensi. 
 
Kata kunci: inisiatif jalan sabuk, diplomasi utang, kekuatan lunak, Tiongkok, Sri Lanka. 
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Background 
Sri Lanka is aware of its 
geostrategic position and the advantages of 
its ports in the Indian Ocean region. One of 
them is Hambantota Harbor which is 
located along one of the busiest shipping 
routes in the world. Sri Lanka has the 
potential to become an advanced 
commercial center so that it can accelerate 
the country's economy and trade with the 
help of infrastructure investments from 
foreign countries such as China. China has 
invested $ 1.5 billion in the Hambantota 
Port Development Project. This investment 
is carried out without proper study or 
consideration of other payment options. 
The port's economic inability, massive 
maintenance costs, and large interest 
payments have caused a serious 'debt trap' 
for Sri Lanka. In December 2016 an initial 
agreement between the two parties was 
signed, in which the Sri Lankan 
government was expected to sell an 80 
percent stake in Hambantota Port for a 99-
year lease worth $ 1.12 billion (Patrick, 
National Maritime Foundation, 13 April 
2017). 
Such vulnerability to global 
influence is one reason China spent 
millions of dollars in 2015 trying to re-elect 
Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
who signed the foreign debt. Mahinda 
Rajapaksa's regime has built closeness with 
China when Sri Lanka faces international 
isolation at the end of a brutal civil war 
between the Sri Lankan government and the 
Tamil Tiger separatist group. China 
continues to provide funding and support 
for Rajapaksa, and instead Rajapaksa 
supports China's foreign policy objectives 
in the region. During his presidency, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa opened the door for 
investors and lenders from China. From 
2010 to 2015, when Rajapaksa came to 
power, China provided a total loan of $ 4.8 
billion to build a number of development 
projects such as Hambantota Harbor, new 
airports, coal-fired power plants and 
highways. In 2016, China increased its loan 
to $ 6 billion to Sri Lanka (The Economic 
Times, 3 September 2018). 
Apart from China's financial 
support in the 2015 elections, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa lost the election to alleged 
corruption cases. But the newly elected 
government has only a few limited choices 
besides agreeing to Chinese requests to 
hand over Hambantota Port in 2017 
because the country's debt is getting worse. 
In 2017, $ 1.12 billion of Sri Lanka's debt 
was written off from a $ 1.5 billion loan by 
China in return for a long-term lease in 
Hambantota Port (The Economic Times, 3 
September 2018).  
In pursuing this dream, Sri Lanka 
relies on development financing from 
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China. Then Sri Lanka was unable to repay 
the loan and in 2017, Sri Lanka agreed to 
give China a controlling equity stake in the 
port and a 99-year lease right to operate it 
(Center for Strategic and International 
Studies,.csis.org, 27 November 2018). Sri 
Lanka officially handed over control of 
Hambantota Port to China as part of a 99-
year lease agreement. Under an agreement 
of $ 1.12 billion which was opposed by 
political opposition groups and trade union 
alliances. Chinese companies now hold a 70 
percent stake in Hambantota Port (The 
National, 14 December 2018). 
 
Research Question 
How does China conduct debt diplomacy 
through investment in Belt and Road 
Initiative in Sri Lanka? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
1. China’s Soft Power and Belt Road 
Initiative 
Joseph S. Nye as mentioned by 
Mustafa Yagci (2018) in "Rethinking Soft 
Power in Light of China's Belt and Road 
Initiative" said that a country's soft power is 
an indirect way to use power in such a way 
that you have the ability to make “other 
people want what you want” and you can 
set the agenda and define the debate 
framework by relying on intangible power 
resources such as culture, ideology, and 
institutions. Nye then gave a more detailed 
explanation of soft power: "Soft power is 
the ability to influence other parties through 
co-optation in framing the agenda, 
persuading, and generating positive 
attraction to obtain the expected results". 
E.H. Carr as mentioned by Mustafa 
Yagci (2018) in "Rethinking Soft Power in 
Light of China's Belt and Road Initiative" 
identified military power, economic power, 
and power over opinion as the three main 
forms of power in the international world 
and stated that although theoretically can be 
separated, in practice hard power and soft 
power are interdependent. Then Joseph S. 
Nye underlined that resource tangibility has 
a secondary role in the conceptualization of 
its soft power and emphasizes the definition 
of soft power behavior. Regardless of 
whether a country uses tangible or 
intangible resources, how these resources 
are used has an important importance in 
bringing behavioral explanations into soft 
power. 
So, if a country can produce co-
optation behavior from other countries 
through attraction rather than coercion, this 
is the implication of soft power. Explaining 
the interdependence between hard power 
and soft power resources, Gallarotti 
emphasizes that hard power can increase 
soft power and vice versa. Thus, it is very 
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important to have an understanding that 
there are interdependencies between hard 
power and soft power resources, which 
cannot be easily distinguished in different 
contexts (Yağci, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 
2018). 
Nye later coined the term "smart 
power" to explain that a combination of soft 
power and hard power resources was 
needed for effective foreign policy. Nye 
suggested that the United States could be a 
smart power country by investing in global 
public goods, whose benefits could be 
enjoyed by all countries. In other words, the 
provision of public goods in the 
international system requires a combination 
of hard power and soft power resources. 
Interestingly, the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) with the promotion of 
infrastructure investment and joint 
development are examples of the supply 
and distribution of global public goods 
offered by China to the world. An important 
aspect of soft power is that countries with 
soft power capabilities need the ability to 
set and frame the agenda so that other 
countries will be interested in providing 
public goods for their own benefit. In BRI, 
China handles shortages, vulnerabilities in 
the global economy, promises solutions and 
builds consensus among many countries for 
their participation. This is a clear indication 
of China's soft power capabilities. In the 
case of BRI, the global political economy 
context formed by unfavorable conditions 
for economic development in the aftermath 
of the Global Financial Crisis and the 
reluctance of the United States to dominate 
the provision of global public goods has left 
a power vacuum easily replaced by China 
(Yağci, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 2018). 
Mustafa Yagci (2018) said in 2004, 
Chinese foreign ministry officials formed a 
diplomatic strategy to accelerate China's 
cultural and economic diplomacy to the 
world and have voiced their concern about 
an unfair international system to encourage 
China's economic diplomacy activities 
abroad. In 2007, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao underlined the importance of 
improving soft power culture to make 
China "more politically influential, more 
economically competitive, more attractive 
in its image, and more morally inspiring". 
Cultural and economic diplomacy activities 
are the most widely used strategies to 
promote Chinese soft power. In the context 
of cultural diplomacy, opening Confucius 
Institutes around the world is an important 
aspect in promoting Chinese soft power. On 
the other hand, China's economic 
diplomacy is the cornerstone of China's soft 
power. 
Since the start of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, China has entered 
its leadership phase for economic 
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diplomacy. The Chinese President, Xi 
Jinping, began pursuing active economic 
diplomacy during the first year of his tenure 
by popularizing the concept of "Chinese 
Dream" and the success story of China's 
economic development supporting China's 
appeal to African countries and the Asia-
Pacific region. Chinese President Xi 
Jinping maintains economic diplomacy 
with an emphasis on increasing the sound 
representation of China and other 
developing countries by reforming the 
international system and global 
governance. From a historical perspective, 
BRI is the latest and most ambitious 
manifestation of China's economic 
diplomacy activities (Yağci, Uluslararası 
İlişkiler, 2018). 
Mustafa Yagci (2018) explains in 
economic diplomacy activities, the state 
seeks to achieve a balance between three 
tensions : 1) tensions between economy and 
politics; 2) tensions between international 
and domestic pressure; 3) and tension 
between the government and other forces. 
Trying to reconcile these tensions, 
economic diplomacy can be described as 
using political tools to advance the 
prosperity of the national economy and use 
economic means to achieve domestic 
political stability. 
In its economic diplomacy 
activities, China has economic and political 
goals. For example, one reason behind 
China's international initiatives was related 
to domestic economic reform efforts. Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party that took place in November 2013 and 
produced a decision to deepen China's 
economic reform by exporting excess 
production capacity to other countries. 
Then utilizing the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves with more profitable 
investments, taking more steps for financial 
liberalization and establishing a mechanism 
of cooperation with developing countries 
(Yağci, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 2018). 
With this reform effort, China aims 
to turn its investment-based economy into a 
consumption-based economy by avoiding 
the trap of middle income and achieving 
higher income levels. On the other hand, 
China is utilizing economic diplomacy in 
achieving foreign policy goals. China does 
not shy away from coercive economic 
diplomacy in pursuing foreign policy 
objectives and China is alleged to have 
carried out these coercive activities secretly 
in order not to damage its international 
image and reputation. Thus, China does not 
hesitate to use economic diplomacy in 
forcing other countries to adhere to certain 
political and security issues that benefit 
their interests (Yağci, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 
2018). 
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These projects require an 
unprecedented level of financial 
investment. China Development Bank, as 
one of the main funders of BRI projects, 
tracks more than 900 projects in 60 
countries worth more than $ 890 billion, 
Bank of China is expected to lend around $ 
100 billion between 2016 and 2018, and 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) examines around 130 projects 
worth $ 159 billion. When these figures 
compared to $ 103.4 billion, the costs were 
equivalent to the Marshall Plan covering 16 
European countries after World War 2, the 
level of influence of BRI became clearer. 
To finance these ambitious projects with 
projected expenditures ranging from $ 4 
trillion to $ 8 trillion, China does not only 
depend on the private and public sectors, 
but also on multilateral organizations and 
financial capital from other countries. 
However, most of the financing is expected 
to come from China. In other words, China 
relies on its hard power resources in the 
effectiveness of its economic diplomacy 
activities (Yağci, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 
2018). 
What distinguishes BRI from 
China's previous economic diplomacy is 
that now China is far stronger, has 
accumulated unprecedented foreign 
exchange reserves and can rely on its 
economic and financial capacity to support 
various BRI-related projects in more than 
60 countries. When the United States 
withdraws from its international obligations 
and has a more protectionist discourse, 
China can take advantage of the vacuum of 
international power and be able to use soft 
power oriented economic diplomacy far 
more effectively by relying on its economic 
and financial capacity. This also underlines 
the interdependence of hard power and soft 
power resources: when countries can rely 
on their hard power resources, they can use 
their soft power much more effectively. 
Increasing economic and financial capacity 
of China gives confidence to the Chinese 
government to pursue ambitious initiatives 
such as BRI. This belief allowed President 
Xi Jinping to include BRI in the Chinese 
Communist Party's constitution at the 19th 
congress and BRI was framed as an 
initiative and foreign policy objective of 
President Xi Jinping (Yağci, Uluslararası 
İlişkiler, 2018). 
 
2. Debt Diplomacy 
In the United States 2018 National Defense 
Strategy, as mentioned by Sam Parker and 
Gabrielle Chefitz (2018) in the "Debtbook 
Diplomacy" :  
China 's Strategic Leveraging of New 
Economic Influence and the 
Consequences for U.S. Foreign 
Policy ", the United States warns that 
China is utilizing a" predatory 
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economy "as a means to achieve 
regional and global strategic goals. 
One type of predatory economy is 
what is referred to as "debt 
diplomacy," which uses debt to obtain 
strategic assets or political influence 
over debtor countries coercively. 
 
Parker and Chefits (2018) explained 
that debt diplomacy itself is not an 
economic tool or a strategic end goal. 
Instead, this is a technique used by China 
by utilizing debt accumulation to advance 
existing strategic goals. Three of China's 
main strategic objectives using this strategy 
are : 1) Filling in the "String of Pearls" to 
complete the "Malacca Dilemma" and the 
power of projects along the important South 
Asian trade routes; 2) weaken and break the 
US-led regional coalition that opposes 
Beijing's claims to the South China Sea; and 
3) enable the Army Navy People's (PLAN) 
to push through the "Second Island Chain" 
to "Pacific blue waters". 
Parker and Chefitz (2018) then 
explain the three stages of how China 
conducts debt diplomacy through the Belt 
and Road Initiative. China has used a 
consistent method to collect and utilize its 
debts, making it possible to describe the 
different stages of debt diplomacy and 
identify countries that will be affected by 
the debt diplomacy trap. 
First, is the stage of investment. 
China has expanded its infrastructure 
investment under the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Work mainly through the 
Bank of China's China Development Bank 
and Export-Import (Exim) which 
collectively has more assets than the 
combined number of all Western-backed 
multilateral development banks. China is 
able to provide longer grace periods and 
long-term loans from other institutions. 
This grace period is very attractive for 
economically weaker countries that are less 
able to access international financing and 
corrupt or authoritarian leaders who are 
seeking political legitimacy and personal 
financial benefits. These politicians tend to 
sign vague contract and financing 
agreements on long-term economic projects 
because they will leave the government 
office long before the bill is due. 
Second, are the stages of construction 
and operation. Chinese projects have a 
reputation for running over budget, with 
poor construction quality and weak security 
standards. After completion, many of these 
projects have produced extraordinary 
returns, most of which were directed back 
to China, making debt payments more 
challenging. In countries such as Sri Lanka 
and Myanmar, public protests have erupted 
over projects that prioritize China's 
interests. The Chinese project failed to 
create local jobs, deteriorating 
environmental conditions, exacerbated 
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corruption and sacrificed state sovereignty. 
In certain cases, this public pressure has 
caused the government to freeze or cancel 
Chinese contracts. 
Third, is the stage of debt collection. 
When countries prove unable to repay their 
debts, China continues to offer debt 
forgiveness in return for political influence 
and strategic equity. As explained by 
analyst Xiaochen Su "by ensuring that these 
debts are paid in some form or another, 
whether it is economic concessions, 
political agreements, or a combination of 
both, China may in the long run form new 
types of diplomatic relations with these 
countries. 
 
Analysis 
Over the years of development and 
renegotiation with China Harbour 
Engineering Company, one of China's 
largest state-owned companies, the 
Hambantota Port Development Project 
shows a negative trend and leads to failure. 
With tens of thousands of ships passing 
along one of the busiest shipping lanes in 
the world, Hambantota Port was only able 
to attract 34 ships in 2012. Then the port 
was handed over to China. Mahinda 
Rajapaksa was dismissed from office in 
2015, but the new Sri Lankan government 
struggled to pay for the debts it had. Under 
heavy pressure and after months of 
negotiating with China, the Sri Lankan 
government handed over Hambantota Port 
and the surrounding 15,000 hectares of land 
were valid for 99 years starting in 
December 2017. The port's surrender gave 
China control of the area just a few hundred 
miles from the coast of India, and became a 
strategic foothold along critical commercial 
and military waterways (The New York 
Times, 2018). 
The debt agreement also raises 
some concerns about President Xi Jinping's 
Belt and Road Initiative which states that 
global investment and lending programs 
will impact debt traps for vulnerable 
countries around the world, encouraging 
corruption and autocratic behavior in 
developing countries. Although Chinese 
officials insist that China's interests in 
Hambantota Port are purely business, Sri 
Lankan officials say that from the outset, 
the intelligence and strategic potential of 
the port location are part of the negotiations 
(The New York Times, 2018). 
 In 2016, China has provided a loan 
of $ 6 billion to Sri Lanka to accelerate 
infrastructure development. But the bulk of 
the debt that will mature over the next five 
years precedes the projections of China's 
loan boom (Nikkei Asian Review, 29 
August 2018). In 2017, Sri Lanka borrowed 
$ 1.5 billion from the International 
Monetary Fund, but this loan was also not 
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enough to cover Sri Lanka's financial 
problems (The Quartz, 2018). 
Meanwhile other analyzes related to 
the condition of Sri Lanka's foreign debt in 
2017 also did not provide a better picture. 
The debt of the Sri Lankan government is 
77.6% of its GDP in 2017, far above the 
average debt ratio of 69.69% in the period 
1950 - 2017 according to the 
Tradingeconomics report. Meanwhile, the 
Sri Lankan government budget deficit 
reaches 5.5% of the country's GDP, adding 
to the burden on its debt. Strengthening the 
budget deficit comes at an imprecise 
moment, Sri Lanka has lived beyond its 
ability to repay debt, as can be seen from 
the ongoing balance deficit, reaching 2.6% 
of the country's GDP in 2017 (The Forbes, 
2018). 
Then in May 2018, Sri Lanka took a 
new $ 1 billion loan from the China 
Development Bank. Sri Lanka is not the 
only country that is now worried about debt 
from China. The Center for Global 
Development, a non-profit research firm, 
analyzes the potential debt of countries to 
China that will be issued when participating 
in the Belt and Road Initiative investment 
scheme. It was concluded that eight 
countries found themselves vulnerable to 
debt above average, namely: Djibouti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Pakistan and Tajikistan (The 
Quartz, 2018). 
Although China has eliminated 
around $ 1.12 billion in debt from the 
Hambantota Port project, Sri Lanka now 
has more debt to China than before, because 
other loans from China continue and 
interest rates remain much higher than other 
international lenders. Estimates of the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Finance describe a 
gloomy thing. In 2018, the Sri Lankan 
government is expected to generate $ 14.8 
billion in state revenues, but the debt 
repayments scheduled to various lenders 
around the world reach $ 12.3 billion (The 
New York Times, 2018). 
In 2018, the Sri Lankan Central 
Bank cooperated with People's Bank of 
China to issue yuan-denominated bonds 
worth $ 250 million. China has become the 
biggest lender to Sri Lanka but Sri Lanka 
maintains its tendency to continue lending 
China, rather than choosing international 
bonds, even though interest rates are higher 
(The Economic Times, 3 September 2018). 
Sri Lanka has also received a syndicated 
loan of $ 1 billion from China Development 
Bank on condition that the Sri Lankan 
Central Bank says Chinese loans are more 
profitable than those offered by Western 
international lenders. After the first $ 500 
million loan package was transferred, Sri 
Lanka maintained a tendency to choose 
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Chinese loans rather than international 
bonds such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or other funding options. At the 
same time, the Sri Lankan government has 
been reminded that its $ 8.5 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves are not sufficient 
for the debt repayment scheme (Nikkei 
Asian Review, 2018). 
In 2018, the total foreign debt of Sri 
Lanka is estimated at $ 55 billion. The 
lenders include China, Japan, the Asian 
Development Bank, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. So that 
between 2019 and 2023, Sri Lanka must 
generate $ 17 billion to be able to pay off 
debts and foreign loans that are due. China 
charged an interest rate of 6.3% for loans to 
Sri Lanka, while the soft loan interest rates 
from the World Bank and Asian 
Depreciation Bank were only 0.25-3%. The 
interest rate of the Indian Credit Line to 
neighboring countries is only 1%, or even 
less in some cases (The Economic Times, 
2018). 
Sri Lanka, which has an economic 
power of $ 87 billion, actually has to 
wrestle with more debt payments in 2019. 
Sri Lanka's balance sheet deficit in 2018 of 
2.2% of gross domestic product will drive 
the total debt burden to be paid in 2018 to $ 
7 billion. Sri Lanka will be an outlier in 
terms of its debt indicators among other 
countries. Sri Lanka's debt ratio amounts to 
77% of its total GDP. This amount is higher 
than the debt to GDP ratio of other countries 
such as India, Pakistan, Malaysia and 
Thailand (Nikkei Asian Review, 2018). 
 
1. The Entry of Chinese Investment in 
the Sri Lanka Infrastructure Project 
It takes about a decade for China to 
make a breakthrough in Sri Lanka, with a 
difficult political and economic background 
in the face of the complicated combination 
of domestic politics and regional 
geopolitics. In 2007, China's presence 
strengthened in Sri Lanka when China 
provided military and diplomatic support to 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa to destroy the 
Tamil Tigers. China quickly positioned 
itself as Sri Lanka's main ally by providing 
military assistance and development. China 
then provided infrastructure projects and 
high-interest loans that made Sri Lanka 
indebted and bound to China. In addition, in 
2013 Beijing upgraded the status of its 
relationship with Colombo to a strategic 
partnership level, and promised an 
additional $ 2 billion in infrastructure 
development. China also expressed a desire 
to sign a free trade agreement with Sri 
Lanka (Tonchev, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies Brief Issues,  2018). 
Between 2005 and 2014, Sri 
Lanka's economy grew largely thanks to 
massive public investment in infrastructure, 
such as highways, ports and airports. All of 
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these projects are funded through foreign 
loans, mostly from Chinese loans. 
However, unlike the previous concession 
loans granted by the World Bank or the 
Asian Development Bank, a significant part 
of debt to China is commercial loans with 
high interest rates in the range of 6%. In 
2013, Sri Lanka's foreign debt grew at a rate 
of 7.1%, becoming the main indicator that 
shows the risk of high debt default 
(Tonchev, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies Brief Issues, 2018). 
In 2007, the Sri Lanka Port 
Authority began designing an economic 
port development plan. Then this 
development project opened up limited 
investment to the business world in 2010. 
The first major loan taken for this project 
came from the Chinese state bank, the 
Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) of $ 307 
million. But to get a loan, Sri Lanka was 
asked to accept the company designated by 
the Chinese government, the China 
Harbour Engineering Company, as a port 
maker. These conditions are a typical 
condition of China for projects around the 
world, and do not allow the bidding process 
to open. Across the region, the Chinese 
government lends billions of dollars and is 
paid back with a premium to hire Chinese 
companies and employ thousands of 
Chinese workers (The New York Times, 
2018). 
Mahinda Rajapaksa opened the 
door for Chinese investors and companies. 
From 2010 to 2015, China provided a $ 4.8 
billion loan to build various infrastructure 
projects including Hambantota Port, new 
airports, coal-fired power plants and 
highways (Nikkei Asian Review, 2018). 
Determined to continue to expand the port 
project, Mahinda Rajapaksa returned to 
borrow $ 757 million to the Chinese 
government in 2012. The Chinese 
government approved Rajapaksa's request 
but the requirements were far more severe. 
The first loan of $ 307 million, initially 
came at a variable rate of interest rates that 
were usually set at above 1 or 2 percent 
after the global financial crisis in 2008. In 
comparison, Japan's similar loan rates for 
infrastructure projects were set to be under 
half a percent. China set its initial loan at a 
much higher interest rate of 6.3 percent but 
to get new funding, Rajapaksa approved the 
proposal (The New York Times, 2018). 
During the 2015 Sri Lanka general 
election, large payments from China's port 
development funds flowed directly into the 
campaign activities of candidate President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had agreed to all 
Chinese requirements and was seen as a key 
ally in China's efforts to weaken Indian 
influence in South Asia. Payments are 
confirmed by cash documents and checks 
detailed in the Sri Lankan government 
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investigation. In the final months of the 
2015 Sri Lanka general election, the 
Chinese Ambassador violated diplomatic 
norms and influenced elections to support 
Mahinda Rajapaksa's regime rather than the 
political opposition (Maithripala Sirisena) 
by threatening to cancel China's economic 
agreement with Sri Lanka. When the 
election time in January drew near, a large 
flow of funding began to flow into the 
financial cash of Rajapaksa's campaign 
team (The New York Times, 2018). 
At least about $ 7.6 million has been 
sent from China Harbor's account at 
Standard Chartered Bank to an affiliated 
bank account to Rajapaksa's campaign 
team. The report details China's Harbor 
account numbers, of which 10 days before 
the election were opened, around $ 3.7 
million were distributed in checks, $ 
678,000 to print campaign shirts and other 
campaign promotional material, $ 297,000 
to buy supporting souvenirs, including sari 
cloth for woman. Another $ 38,000 was 
paid to popular Buddhist monks who 
supported Rajapaksa's campaign, while two 
checks worth $ 1.7 million were sent by 
volunteers to Temple Trees, his official 
residence. Most payments come from 
account accounts controlled by China 
Harbour, called "HPDP Phase 2", an 
abbreviation for the Hambantota Port 
Development Project (The New York 
Times, 2018).  
Increasing debt of infrastructure 
projects, the issue of the flow of Chinese 
funds to candidate President Rajapaksa 
caused Sri Lanka's political opposition to 
get a strong political issue and they 
campaigned with suspicion about China's 
intervention in the 2015 elections. These 
political issues caused Mahinda Rajapaksa 
to lose in the 2015 general election. 
 
2. Problems in the Hambantota Port 
Development Project 
The Hambantota Port construction 
project did not appear in a short time, but it 
resulted from a series of decisions by the Sri 
Lankan government. Many other 
infrastructure projects funded by China 
were not requested to return, but 
Hambantota Port was not included in the 
project. The construction of Hambantota 
Port has been the official development plan 
of the Sri Lankan government since 2002. 
In 2003, SNC Lavalin, a French 
construction company, completed a 
feasibility study for the port. A task unit 
appointed by the Sri Lankan government 
reviewed and rejected the results of the 
study. The unit criticized a feasibility study 
that ignored the potential impact of 
Colombo Port, which in recent years has 
handled 95 percent of Sri Lanka's 
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international trade (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2018). 
The Hambantota Port construction 
project is an initiative of the Sri Lankan 
government to further develop a strategic 
port and plan an industrial zone of 1,235 
hectares. The port project was financed and 
built by China Merchants Port Holdings 
Company, a company wholly owned by the 
Chinese government. China Merchants Port 
Holdings has a subsidiary, Colombo 
International Container Terminal Limited, 
which in addition to developing 
Hambantota Port, also operates the South 
Colombo Terminal through a 35-year 
Build-Operate-Transfer agreement 
(Patrick, National Maritime Foundation, 
2017). 
Anjelina Patrick (2017) Indian 
National Maritime Foundation researcher 
in "China - Sri Lanka Strategic Hambantota 
Port Deal" said that between 2005 and 
2006, Ramboll, a Danish consulting 
company conducted a feasibility study on 
the construction of Hambantota Port. The 
development project is divided into three 
phases. The first phase of the development 
project has been completed and is now 
entering an operational period. The 
construction of the first phase is estimated 
to cost $ 360 million, with 85 percent of the 
funding coming from China Exim Bank and 
the remaining 15 percent funding financed 
by Sri Lankan Port Authority. In addition to 
loans, Sri Lanka must incur additional costs 
such as payments to Danish consulting 
companies, land costs obtained for 
construction and payment of fluctuating 
equipment costs. 
Construction work for the second 
phase of the project has been substantially 
completed. The second phase is estimated 
to cost around $ 750 million. The 
development project also includes an 
artificial island, which was built with 
excavated material obtained from the 
construction of Hambantota Port. The 
island is located within the boundary of the 
port development area and has an area of 
around 43 hectares. The third phase of the 
development project is expected to be 
completed by 2023, but this development 
project appears null and void (Patrick, 
National Maritime Foundation, 2017). 
In 2006, Ramboll then completed a 
second feasibility study. The study 
produced an optimistic view of the potential 
of ports based on traffic projections on Sri 
Lanka's future growth from ports in 
Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee. 
Receiving and dismantling bulk cargo 
(commodities and goods loaded separately 
rather than standard containers) will 
provide the main source of shipping traffic 
until 2030, when the balance will begin to 
shift towards container traffic. In 2040, 
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Hambantota Port is projected to handle 20 
million containers of twenty feet (TEU) 
containers, comparable to the fifth busiest 
port in the world in 2015 (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2018). 
With this assessment, President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa gained legitimacy to 
realize the project's development. Chosen 
in the 2005 elections, Rajapaksa has 
promised to develop the southern district of 
Sri Lanka, especially his native 
Hambantota region, which is one of the 
areas devastated by the 2004 tsunami 
disaster. During Rajapaksa's reign, Sri 
Lanka began a series of ambitious 
infrastructure projects. Many of these large-
scale infrastructure projects including 
international airports, cricket stadiums and 
ports have three things in common: they use 
Chinese financing, Chinese contracting 
companies and guarantee the name 
Mahinda Rajapaksa (Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2018). 
Hambantota Port has a value of $ 1 
billion, such a value is not only business 
dimension but also political. Hambantota's 
development vision is to bring more ships 
to Sri Lanka and reduce the volume density 
of ships in Colombo Port. Sri Lanka is 
located on the sea lane crossed by oil 
shipping trips from the Middle East, 
making the issue of energy security the 
main reason China wants to invest in Sri 
Lanka (BBC News, 2017). Emphasizing the 
political approach rather than market 
demands, this approach failed to place 
Hambantota Port in a larger development 
strategy. Colombo Port handles 5.7 million 
TEUs in 2016 and will continue to grow in 
the coming years. If Port Colombo's plan is 
realized, its capacity will increase to 35 
million TEUs in 2040. The initial plan of 
Hambantota Port focused on fuel services, 
but under Rajapaksa the plan was increased 
to include other activities, most of which 
had been carried out at Colombo Harbor. 
The problem of developing Hambantota 
actually came from Sri Lanka's own 
domestic (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2018). 
In 2012, Hambantota Harbor 
struggled to attract more ships to come, 
where container ships preferred to dock at 
Colombo Harbor. To increase the number 
of ships coming to Hambantota Port, the Sri 
Lankan government then issued a decision 
in 2012, that ships carrying imported cars to 
the port of Colombo would drop their cargo 
at Hambantota to start businesses there. 
However, only about 34 ships docked in 
Hambantota in 2012, compared with 3,667 
ships in Colombo Port, according to the 
annual report of the Sri Lanka Ministry of 
Finance (The New York Times, 2018). 
Hambantota Port has been 
optimized by the Sri Lankan government to 
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be able to generate profits, but the port is 
difficult to develop because its territory is 
still isolated. Without a hub-industrial area 
in the vicinity, there is nothing that can 
become a natural customer for the port. But 
now China seems to be taking over the port. 
China wants to fix the isolated region's 
problem and talk with the Sri Lankan 
government about plans to build a large 
economic zone. China plans to buy 15,000 
hectares of land and build factories and 
offices around the Hambantota Port 
complex. The amount of Sri Lanka's debt in 
the construction of Hambantota reached $ 
64 billion, around 95 percent of all Sri 
Lanka's income is used for debt repayment 
(BBC News, 2017). 
Sri Lanka was then caught up in 
debt diplomacy carried out by China and is 
now struggling to repay the loan money. 
The Sri Lankan government finally signed 
an agreement to give Chinese companies 
share ownership in the port as a way to pay 
for part of the debt. Interest rates on 
Chinese loans are often very high. The first 
phase of the Hambantota Port project is a 
loan of $ 307 million with an interest of 6.3 
percent. Multilateral development banks 
usually offer loans with interest rates 
between 2 or 3 percent, and sometimes 
close to 0 percent. The reason why China 
managed to lock Sri Lanka at this high 
interest rate is because there are often no 
other loan alternatives available. Another 
reason is that Chinese loans are not so strict 
in their requirements for project safeguards. 
The absence of other competitive offers for 
Hambantota Harbor shows that other 
potential lenders do not see potential 
benefits commensurate with project risk 
(Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2018). 
The Hambantota Port project has 
suffered heavy losses due to ongoing 
maintenance costs, debt repayments, and 
interest payments. Sri Lanka's total debt is 
approximately $ 64.9 billion, of which $ 8 
billion is owed to China. For the 
Hambantota Port project alone, Sri Lanka 
has borrowed $ 307 million from China at 
an interest rate of 6.3 percent. This large 
debt is generated from the decision of the 
Rajapaksa government, which has obtained 
loans for large-scale infrastructure 
development projects from China without 
adequate assessment of its implications 
(Patrick, National Maritime Foundation, 
2017).  
Then in 2015, the Siresena 
government inherited this debt. Unable to 
generate revenue from a failed project and 
with a large loan to repay, Sri Lanka has 
fallen into a debt trap, causing Sirisena's 
government to enter into an agreement with 
China Merchants Port Holdings Company. 
The Sirisena government believes that the 
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only feasible agreement is to convert the 
loan into equity to alleviate some of the debt 
to China (Patrick, National Maritime 
Foundation, 2017). 
 
3. Failure to Pay-Debt and Hand Over of 
Hambantota Port 
After the defeat of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa in the 2015 election, the new 
government led by President Maithripala 
Sirisena held the power with a mandate to 
carry out a scrutinization of Sri Lanka's 
financial transactions and stop the 
construction process in Hambantota Port. 
Sri Lanka faces a terrifying amount of debt 
under Rajapaksa's government, the 
country's debt has tripled to $ 44.8 billion 
when he left power. In 2015, payments of $ 
4.68 billion were due at the end of the year. 
In 2016, Sri Lankan government officials 
began meeting with the Chinese 
government to reach an agreement. Sri 
Lanka hopes that port debt can be removed 
from the Sri Lanka balance sheet and avoid 
outright defaults. But the Chinese 
government demands that Chinese 
companies can take the dominant share of 
equity in the port in return. When Sri Lanka 
is given the choice of where Chinese state 
companies will take control of the port: 
China Harbour or China Merchants Port 
Holdings according to the final agreement 
between the two countries (The New York 
Times, 2018). 
China Merchants Port Holdings 
obtained the contract and urged more. 
Company officials demanded 15,000 
hectares of land around the port to be built 
for an industrial zone. Chinese companies 
argue that the port itself is not worth $ 1.1 
billion to be paid for its equity, money that 
will cover Sri Lanka's debt at the port 
project. The Sri Lankan government has 
fiercely opposed the terms put forward by 
China, but there is no way out. The new 
agreement was signed in July 2017, and 
came into force in December 2017. The 
agreement left some signs of Sri Lanka's 
ownership of the existence of a joint 
company to manage port operations and 
collect revenues. The share ownership in 
the company is 85 percent owned by China 
Merchants Port Holdings and the remaining 
15 percent is controlled by the Sri Lankan 
government (The New York Times, 2018). 
Sri Lanka's small shares will not 
mean much in the future, given the large 
influence that China Merchants Port 
Holdings has on board personnel and 
operational decisions. When the agreement 
was initially negotiated, there was a gap 
that was left open where the surrounding 
ports and land could be used by the Chinese 
military, where Indian officials asked the 
Sri Lankan government to explicitly 
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prohibit this. The final agreement prohibits 
foreign countries from using ports for 
military purposes unless given permission 
by the government in Colombo. The clause 
was included in the agreement because the 
Chinese Navy submarine was on its way to 
Sri Lanka (The New York Times, 2018). 
Sirisena's new government 
promises to reduce Sri Lanka's dependence 
on China, but financial pressure has forced 
it to maintain relations with China. Initially 
the new government suspended a large 
infrastructure project invested by China, 
namely the construction of a new city built 
off the coast of Colombo above the 
reclamation area. But the $ 1.4 billion debt 
that it brings has proved difficult to reject 
and rebuilding continued in 2016. The hope 
is to turn the region into a modern city by 
2040, with corporate buildings, apartment 
blocks, hotels, resorts, beaches, malls and 
even the marina. China Harbor Engineering 
Company (CHEC), which is working on the 
construction project, will acquire around 
two-thirds of the land marketed with a 99-
year lease in return for its investment (BBC 
News, 2017). 
In October 2016, Sri Lankan Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced 
that China Merchants Port Holdings would 
hold an 80% stake in Hambantota Port in 
exchange for more than $ 1 billion in state 
debt. This share shift will have an impact on 
neighboring countries such as India, 
because China has used Colombo South 
Container Terminal, which is also owned 
by the same Chinese company, to close 
submarines to the pier. This is contrary to 
the Sri Lanka Port Authority's mooring 
design intended for military ships. 
Previously Sri Lanka intended to hide the 
visit of two Chinese naval vessels from 
media coverage. With a majority share of 
Hambantota Port being sold to China's 
semi-private sector, India must be prepared 
to accept the possibility of another visit by 
the People's Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) for a longer period of time 
(Gunasekara, Asia Pacific Bulletin, 372, 
2017). 
In December 2016, the Sri Lanka 
Port Authority and China Merchants Port 
Holdings signed their first agreement. The 
agreement states that the Sri Lankan 
government will sell 80 percent of the $ 
1.12 billion Hambantota Port for a 99-year 
lease, to Chinese companies. About 20 
percent of the remaining shares are owned 
by the Sri Lanka Port Authority. Total 
leased land includes all port infrastructure, 
industrial zones, artificial islands, naval 
areas, all of which are built on port 
properties. According to Sri Lanka's 
Minister of Finance, Ravi Karunanayake, 
Sri Lanka's debt problems can only be 
resolved by first completing high-interest 
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loans through the sale of Hambantota Port 
(Patrick, National Maritime Foundation, 
2017 ). 
On March 21, 2017, the agreement 
witnessed unexpected changes in its content 
due to widespread protests and 
demonstrations by the Sri Lankan people, in 
connection with the sale of 80 percent of the 
proposed ports and industrial zones. The Sri 
Lankan cabinet agreed and proposed a 
renegotiation of the agreement aimed at 
reducing current Chinese share ownership 
in the Hambantota Port project. The 
proposed revised agreement states that 
Chinese companies must agree to divest a 
maximum of 20 percent of initial share 
ownership by 80 percent in the next decade 
to Sri Lankan companies. (Patrick, National 
Maritime Foundation, 2017) 
Due to the strong debt pressure, the 
Sri Lankan government finally failed to 
divest a maximum of 20 percent of China's 
share ownership of the Hambatonta Port. 
Sri Lanka then gave majority control over 
Hambantota Port to China in an effort to 
repay debts borrowed from China. In 2017, 
China Merchants Port Holdings paid $ 584 
million as part of a $ 1.12 billion agreement 
to operate Hambantota Port. Based on the 
agreement signed in July 2017, China 
Merchants Port Holdings will operate the $ 
1.5 billion Hambantota Port for a period of 
99 years. The amount of $ 1.12 billion will 
be used to reduce the amount of Sri Lankan 
government debt to China (The Forbes, 20 
September 2018). In December 2017, Sri 
Lanka officially handed over control of 
Hambantota Port to China as part of a 99-
year lease agreement. Under an agreement 
of $ 1.12 billion which was opposed by 
political opposition and trade unions (The 
National, 2018). 
Chinese companies now hold a 70 
percent stake in Hambantota Port. The Sri 
Lankan government has struggled to pay 
off debt, because the project caused 
enormous debt. Along with loans taken for 
other infrastructure development projects, 
Colombo now owes a total of $ 8 billion. 
Chinese companies under China Merchants 
Port Holdings now hold a majority stake in 
the port as part of a joint venture with the 
Port Authority of Sri Lanka. The lease 
agreement signed in July 2017 also includes 
extensive tax concessions for ports and 32-
year tax breaks for Chinese companies. For 
the tax portion, China has paid Sri Lanka a 
total of $ 300 million by paying further 
taxes at an unclear time (The National, 
2018). 
For Beijing, the take over of 
Hambantota Port is a long-term part of the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. 
Other BRI projects include a $ 10.7 billion 
plan to develop the city of Duqm (Oman) 
into an industrial city that will turn the 
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small port into a major transit center. Closer 
to Hambantota is the Gwadar Port 
(Pakistan) developed by Beijing as an 
important part of the $ 55 billion China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In 
addition to Sri Lanka, China has also added 
the Maldives in the Indian Ocean into the 
scope of its economic influence through a 
free trade agreement at the end of 
November 2017 (The National, 2018). 
 
4. Strategic Implication of China 
Ownership on Hambantota Port 
The case of handing over 
Hambantota Port is an important part of a 
network of important access points in the 
Indian Ocean that was acquired by China, 
which helped China to weaken the Malacca 
Strait which was identified as a strategic 
meeting point by former President Hu 
Jintao in 2003. Besides China's dependence 
on sea trade routes access to the Indian 
Ocean without having to go through the 
Malacca Strait connects the Western 
provinces of China to supply route 
networks for important strategic 
commodities and reduce thousands of miles 
of travel in the sea. This is the main reason 
for the continued presence of China on the 
edge of the Indian Ocean including Sri 
Lanka, as part of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (Tonchev, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies Brief Issues, 
2018). 
Furthermore, the control of 
Hambantota Port can increase China's 
economic presence throughout the South 
Asian region. India and Sri Lanka already 
have FTAs that allow Sri Lankan goods to 
enter Indian wide markets without import 
duties. Thus, Chinese manufacturers can 
use future assembly facilities in 
Hambantota Port and India-Sri Lanka FTA 
to export low-priced consumer goods to the 
South Asian region. In addition to the 
obvious geopolitical implications of 
Beijing's influence in Sri Lanka, the 
prospect of China's economic expansion in 
the wider region is another reason to pay 
attention to India (Tonchev, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies Brief 
Issues, 2018). 
Hambantota Port exemplifies 
important aspects of China's understanding 
of connectivity, both in terms of content 
and modality. There is a clear focus on 
infrastructure along the Belt and Road 
Initiative route, with a view to supplying 
important strategic chains to Beijing. It is 
increasingly clear that in the Indian Ocean, 
China is implementing a comprehensive 
plan that combines energy security, trade, 
manufacturing and financial services on a 
regional and global scale. In addition, it 
appears that the infrastructure built or 
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acquired by China has the potential to be 
used for multiple purposes, with a strong 
installed security component as illustrated 
by the presence of Chinese military vessels 
in Sri Lanka. This inevitably led to the 
deterioration of regional competition in 
what later became the 'Sino-Indian Ocean' 
(Tonchev, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies Brief Issues, 2018). 
Controling Hambantota Port is part 
of China's geopolitical goals which will see 
Beijing challenge the United States as the 
world's main maritime power. There are 
fears that China might use ports such as 
Hambantota, Duqm and Gwadar as naval 
bases. But Chinese, Indian competitors 
have their own plans. In response to China's 
presence in Sri Lanka and along the Indian 
Ocean, India is planning to purchase 40 
years of lease rights from unused airports 
along the $ 300 million Hambantota Port. 
Key elements in overseas naval bases and 
even logistics facilities are air access for 
people's distribution and logistics. India 
will spend $ 300 million to buy airports in 
order to ward off and block Chinese naval 
bases. So far China has only one overseas 
naval base located in the port of Doraleh in 
Djibouti. This base has been officially 
operating since August 2017 (The National, 
2018). 
In May 2017, Sri Lanka refused a 
request from Beijing to close submarines in 
Hambantota Port. When the Sirisena 
government took power, it sought 
guarantees that the Hambantota Port would 
never again welcome Chinese submarines. 
This is of particular concern because 
Chinese submarines are difficult to detect 
and are often used for intelligence 
gathering. But the Sri Lankan government 
simply does not have strong control. After 
the handing over of Hambantota Port to 
China raises concerns about the possibility 
of military use, because China continues to 
militarize ownership of the island around 
the South China Sea. The Sri Lankan 
government shows that the agreement 
explicitly ruled out China's military use of 
the port. But the Sri Lankan government 
that still owes China can be pressured to 
allow a Chinese military presence at the 
port (The New York Times, 2018). 
The last political development in Sri 
Lanka showed a shock where Mahinda 
Rajapaksa returned to power by serving as 
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. President 
Maithripala Sirisena on Friday 
(10/26/2018) sacked Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and took the oath of 
Mahinda Rajapaksa as prime minister. 
Rajapaksa's return to power triggered 
public protests and had consequences for 
the future of democracy, the credit level and 
the Sri Lankan financial market. 
Rajapaksa's proximity to Beijing could also 
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make Colombo more vulnerable to China's 
influence which continued to strengthen 
(CNBC News, 2018), President Sirisena 
suspended parliament, causing Sri Lanka to 
fall into a constitutional crisis. Sudden 
political reorganization will strengthen 
Rajapaksa, whose new party won success in 
local elections in February 2018 and 
disrupted political stability. Rajapaksa's 
rise was the second opportunity for China 
to play a dominant role in Sri Lanka's 
politics and development. With Rajapaksa, 
China will further strengthen its influence 
and presence in Sri Lanka and the Indian 
Ocean region (Foreign Policy, 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
China through its Belt Road 
Initiative and infrastructure investment in 
Sri Lanka has effectively demonstrated the 
use of soft power and hard power in 
achieving its foreign policy goals. China 
combines the means of economic 
diplomacy and its economic power to carry 
out an ambitious global connectivity project 
through the Belt and Road Initiative. China 
intelligently took the momentum to fill the 
gap in the position of the main distributor of 
global public goods after the United States 
resigned after the Global Financial Crisis. 
In the context of geopolitical strategies in 
the Indian Ocean and South Asia, China 
sees the strategic position of Sri Lanka, an 
island nation in southeast India. If China 
can take control of the sea trade route 
through the control of ports in Sri Lanka, 
then China can secure important trade 
routes in South Asia and weaken the 
strategic role of the Malacca Strait in the 
world sea trade route. 
In addition, China also carried out 
three stages in debt diplomacy with Sri 
Lanka and succeeded in taking over 
Hambantota Port with a 99-year lease 
contract. The three stages are: 1) Stages of 
investment, 2) Stages of construction and 
operation, and  3) Stages of debt collection 
and expropriation. In the case study of 
Hambantota Port, China managed to trap 
Sri Lanka with loans that had high interest 
rates and conditions that benefited China 
such as the appointment of Chinese 
companies in port development projects. 
The strength of China's influence on 
development projects is reinforced by 
political intervention such as full support 
for the regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa who 
is close to China. High-interest foreign debt 
bondage in large-scale infrastructure 
projects made Sri Lanka trapped in China's 
debt diplomacy and forced Sri Lanka to 
approve a $ 1.12 billion debt relief 
agreement in exchange for handing over the 
99-year lease of Hambantota Port. 
Take over and control Hambantota 
Port has a strategic implication on China in 
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the geopolitical context of the Indian Ocean 
and South Asia. China can cut access to 
goods from the Indian Ocean without 
having to go through the Malacca Strait. 
China can also make Sri Lanka the entry 
point for Chinese-produced goods to India 
and South Asia, moreover Sri Lanka and 
India have an agreement on a free trade 
agreement (FTA) that facilitates entry of 
goods without charge. On the security 
aspect, Hambantota Port can be used as a 
Chinese naval base other than Duqm Port 
(Oman) and Gwadar Port (Pakistan). The 
controling of Hambantota Port can increase 
the presence of the People's Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) along the Indian 
Ocean and open access to sea trade which is 
more open to the South Asian region, West 
Asia, the Middle East and the Continent of 
Africa.     
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